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ABSTRACT 
According to the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, business 
owe remediation when they “cause” or “contribute to” a human rights impact, but not when 
they are only “directly linked to” it. These terms determine when a victim is entitled to seek 
remediation from a business, but they have largely been ignored in existing scholarship. This 
article investigates the meaning of “cause, contribute, and directly linked to”, revealing 
confusion and uncertainty before proposing a new system, built on existing authoritative 
guidance, for interpreting the terms and determining when businesses owe remediation for their 
human rights impacts. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 The Chinese government has reportedly forced more than 80,000 Uyghur workers to 
labor in factories that produce goods for transnational corporations including Apple, BMW, 
Nike, Samsung, and Volkswagen.1 China claims that participation in its labor transfer programs 
is voluntary.2 Independent research, however, suggests that members of the ethnic and religious 
minority community risk arbitrary detention if they do not participate, while at work they are 
isolated, monitored, prevented from practicing their religion, and subjected to “patriotic 
education” classes.3 Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the allegations are true, do the 
retail companies have a responsibility to provide remedies and reparations to the workers 
forced to labor in their supply chains? For decades, scholars, civil society, businesses, and 
governments have debated the appropriate answer to this question.4 In this article, I offer a new 
approach for answering this question, one that builds upon and aligns with the 2011 United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“UNGPs” or “Guiding 
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Principles”),5 but challenges existing applications of the UNGPs. This proposed system has the 
potential to clarify and provide nuance to complex cases while encouraging businesses to 
proactively address their human rights “impacts.”6  
 Currently the most authoritative statement on the responsibility of businesses for human 
rights in international law, the value-added of the UNGPs stems from the recognition of an 
independent responsibility on all businesses to respect all human rights in all contexts.7 The 
other two “pillars” of the Guiding Principles—the state’s responsibility to protect human rights 
from interference by business and the rights of victims to adequate remedial processes—reflect 
existing international human rights law (“IHRL”).8 The business responsibility to respect, 
however, was designed to change “what we consider ‘reasonable’” conduct by businesses9 so 
as to provide “tangible results for affected individuals and communities.”10 As part of the 
independent responsibility to respect, businesses have a responsibility to remedy harms they 
“cause” or “contribute to.”11 If a business is only “directly linked to” the harm, it does not need 
to provide remedies but can instead use its “leverage” to affect change in its business partners.12 
Intended as sui generis terms,13 “cause,” “contribute,” and “directly linked to” (collectively 
referred to here as the “participation terms”14) are central to defining businesses’ responsibility 
under the UNGPs.15 Yet their meaning has rarely been examined.16 The literature on the 
business responsibility to respect has primarily focused on enforcement mechanisms,17 while 
the literature on remedies principally addresses the procedural demands of judicial and non-
judicial processes.18  
The limited guidance on the participation terms to date rests on definitions provided by 
the United Nations (“UN”) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”), 
which found a business “causes” an impact when its acts or omissions, without the involvement 
of other parties, reduces the realization of a right.19 A business “contributes” where its conduct 
together with those of others negatively impacts on a right.20 Where it neither causes nor 
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contributes to a harm, a business may be “directly linked to” it via operations, products, 
services, and business relationships.21 The OHCHR’s definitions, offered in the abstract, do 
little to clarify businesses’ remedial responsibilities. Since they are not acting on their own, 
Apple and Volkswagen are clearly not “causing” the harm, but are they “contributing to” or 
merely “directly linked to” the harms inflicted on the Uyghurs? The answer is unclear under 
the current definitions.  
Subsequent literature has applied the OHCHR’s definitions to real and hypothetical 
examples but without significant analysis.22 As I reveal in Part 3, this had led to contradictory 
guidance with unclear reasoning. States have begun drafting and adopting legislation to 
implement the UNGPs,23 and businesses have developed non-judicial processes to address their 
responsibilities,24 without knowing when the UNGPs expect businesses to provide 
remediation. This has practical implications for victims. If it is unclear when businesses owe 
remedies, it is uncertain when victims have a right to pursue them. Even where appropriate 
processes are put in place, victims’ may not be able to secure the remediation they are entitled 
to.  
Unlike earlier scholarship that debated the theoretical basis for assigning human rights 
obligations to businesses,25 this article builds on the UNGPs’ recognition of a responsibility to 
remediate and questions the conditions needed to trigger that responsibility. I first consider the 
need for sui generis terms and then examine the existing guidance on the terms’ meaning. I 
explain that the OHCHR definitions unduly emphasize the number of actors involved, creating 
incentives for businesses to restructure operations so as to avoid liability rather than to avoid 
human rights impacts. This approach is unhelpful and could undermine the transformative 
promise of the UNGPs. By critically analyzing the existing guidance I identify implicit factors 
that can be brought together to form a system of responsibility,26 giving definition to the 
participation terms. I reconceptualize the participation terms in light of these factors, asserting 
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that the difference between the participation terms rests in the strength and confluence of the 
factors identified: the power, independence, and mitigation efforts of the business; and the 
predictability and severity of the harm. In Part 5, I apply my proposed system to the case of the 
Uyghur laborers and conclude, in Part 6, that my approach charts a path for the practical 
implementation of the UNGPs. 
II. THE CREATION OF SUI GENERIS STANDARDS OF RESPONSIBILITY 
Understanding why the UNGPs use sui generis terms rather than existing legal 
frameworks can help explain their purpose and importance. Built on the premise of “principled 
pragmatism,” the UNGPs expect businesses to respect human rights by refraining from 
interfering in their realization.27 Non-binding on their own, the UNGPs have been embraced 
by states and businesses, who have accepted the UNGPs as an articulation of what should be, 
even if it does not reflect the law as it is now.28 As such, they serve as a means of assessing the 
adequacy of law, public policy, and business practice. 
The UNGPs encourage businesses to engage with “human rights due diligence” 
(“HRDD”) in order to meet proactively identify risks posed by the business, and mitigate and 
remediate impacts the business causes or contributes to.29 According to the official 
Commentary to the UNGPs, while HRDD is important for ensuring the business respects 
human rights, it may not “automatically and fully absolve” a business of liability where it has 
caused or contributed to a harm.30 This left a question as to when HRDD might affect a 
business’s responsibility to remediate. Jonathan Bonnitcha and Robert McCorquodale argued 
that a strict responsibility to remediate was appropriate for a business’s direct harms, but 
suggested the responsibility for indirect responsibilities could be absolved through HRDD.31 
This was rebuffed by the UNGPs’ author, former UN Special Representative to the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, John Ruggie, writing together with John Sherman.32 The latter duo claimed that 
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businesses owe remediation whenever they directly or indirectly “cause” or “contribute to” a 
harm, even if the business has acted diligently.33 This was echoed by the UN Working Group 
on Business and Human Rights, who concluded that the business responsibility for human 
rights “is a function of impact,” rather than a result of negligence or diligence.34 This is 
appropriate. The foundational responsibility of businesses is to “avoid infringing on the human 
rights of others.”35 HRDDD is only a means of realizing that responsibility, rather than the 
responsibility itself. 
The introduction of the participation terms in the UNGPs was controversial. Without 
clear content, scholars often use the terms only in passing, if at all, before focusing their 
research on well-trod areas of international and domestic criminal law and domestic tort law.36 
In early critiques, Robert Blitt, Björn Fasterling and Geert Demuijnck complained that the 
undefined participation terms effectively gave businesses the authority to determine their own 
responsibility.37 Earlier scholarship, Ruggie’s preparatory work for the UNGPs, and the 
UNGPs’ Commentary engaged the language of “complicity.”38 Fasterling and Demuijnck 
argued that Ruggie should have employed “well elaborated” categories of complicity.39 Yet, 
Ruggie chose the sui generis participation terms to trigger businesses’ remedial 
responsibilities. Blitt, Fasterling and Demuijnck never considered why Ruggie might have 
done this. Ruggie himself has not directly addressed this choice.40 
Ruggie has, however, insisted that the business responsibility to respect human rights, 
which includes the responsibility to remediate harms a business causes or contributes to, is not 
derived from existing law and should not be confused with it.41 His objection might reflect a 
general dislike of legal formalism,42 but it seems more likely that he recognized the dangers of 
transposing norms from existing legal frameworks.43 Legal systems use concepts like 
complicity or aiding and abetting in similar but not synonymous ways.44 Terms with numerous, 
complex, and debated meanings can give rise to anthropological equivocations, errors in 
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understanding that arise when two people (or cultures) use the same word to express different 
meanings without realizing it.45 When states adopt a legal standard from another system the 
norm’s original meaning may be “nullified, modified, distorted or remodeled, often giving rise 
to something new that may in turn circulate back to the context of original production.”46 For 
the UNGPs, a term like complicity carries the risk of numerous layers of modifications, moving 
from original systems with competing ideas of complicity into BHR, “contaminating” the 
UNGPs,47 and then back into domestic systems or into new systems through the 
implementation of the Guiding Principles.  
BHR has experienced the confusion that arises from ambiguous terms, particularly that 
of complicity. First, as the UNGPs’ Commentary notes, commentary has “both non-legal and 
legal meanings.”48 One might consider a business morally complicity even where it does not 
meet the unique, technical requirements for legal complicity in domestic and international 
law.49 Second, US courts became mired in a debate over the necessary mens rea for complicity 
under international criminal law (“ICL”) when claimants brought cases against businesses 
under the anomalous Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), which allows foreigners to sue in US courts 
for violations of customary international law.50 US courts invoked complicity in ICL, but ICL 
did not offer a single standard for complicity.51 US courts varyingly applied a “knowledge” 
test intended to reflect customary international law,52 or a “purpose” test intended to reflect 
what US courts believed the International Criminal Court’s statute required.53 The International 
Criminal Court had not yet decided its own standards, so US courts interpreted “purpose” in a 
manner that reflected US domestic law.54 The appropriate mens rea for the ATS remains 
uncertain,55 but the debate over when and how businesses might be “complicit” under 
international law dominated BHR scholarship for years.56 
Had the UNGPs invoked a term like complicity, it might have led states to assume 
compliance on the basis of their existing complicity standards. Rather than motivate necessary 
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changes, this could have reinforced deficient approaches. Clearly defined sui generis 
participation terms, on the other hand, can draw attention to differences between the UNGPs 
and existing legal frameworks and should encourage states to question their compliance. For 
this to work, however, the participation terms need to be better articulated and understood. 
III. CURRENT GUIDANCE 
As noted above, OHCHR has found that a business “causes” an impact when it reduces 
the realization of a right on its own, without the contribution “of clients or other 
stakeholders.”57 It “contributes” where the harm occurs as a result of the business’s conduct 
together with that others.58 “Contributing to,” according to OHCHR, requires some “element 
of causality” that extends beyond “trivial or minor” effect but the conduct need not rise to 
conditio sine qua non.59 While the OECD used stronger language, suggesting the 
“[c]ontribution must be substantial,” it also found this simply excludes “minor or trivial 
contributions.”60 Rachel Davis, a member of Ruggie’s team during the UNGPs’ development, 
pointed to three distinct ways a business may “contribute to” a harm: it may “facilitate or 
enable” abuse; create “strong incentives” for a third party to breach IHRL; or undertake 
activities “in parallel with a third party, leading to cumulative impacts” that harm a right.61 
Finally, a business can be “directly linked” to a harm via its products, services, operations, or 
business relationships when it neither causes nor contributes to the impact.62 This requires a 
relationship between the business and the harm, not merely the business and the other party.63 
A business that is “directly linked to” an impact “has the least direct control or influence over 
whether the impact occurs.”64  
Normally, a business that is “directly linked to” an impact need only use leverage to 
affect change.65 Sometimes, however, the Guiding Principles recognize that the severity of an 
impact requires a business to terminate a relationship where it is “directly linked to” a harm.66 
According to the Commentary, “the more severe the abuse, the more quickly the enterprise will 
 8
need to see change.”67 Businesses that maintain a relevant relationship “should be able to 
demonstrate … ongoing efforts to mitigate the impact and be prepared to accept any 
consequences – reputational, financial or legal – of the continuing connection.”68 The 
OHCHR’s definitions seem to suggest that the number of actors involved, and the directness 
of the relationship between the business and the harm, are the primary considerations for 
determining a business’s responsibility. Both criteria are questionable. 
According to OHCHR and Ruggie, the participation terms sit on a “continuum.”69 
Where a business is “directly linked to” a harm and “fails to take reasonable steps to prevent 
or mitigate” the impact, the business’s responsibility may increase.70 This can mean it is 
“contributing to” the harm and owes remedies for the impacts.71 OHCHR did not explicitly 
address whether the continuum of responsibility also extends from “contribute” to “cause.” 
The OHCHR definitions, however, only ascribe “cause” responsibility if a business acts 
alone,72 indicating it would be impossible for a business to move along the continuum from 
“directly linked to” or “contributing” to “causing” it. This may explain why Bonnitcha and 
McCorquodale concluded that a business’s responsibility could be divided between cause and 
contribute, on the one hand, and directly linked to on the other.73 If the difference between 
“cause” and “contribute” is only the number of actors involved, the terms appear qualitatively 
the same. Yet, Ruggie and Sherman responded by asserting that there are three unique 
categories, with “cause” and “contribute” representing distinct forms of responsibility.74 This 
would suggest “cause” is supposed to be qualitatively different than “contributes to,” is the 
most severe form of responsibility, and the end-point for the responsibility continuum.  
Centering the participation terms’ definitions on the number of actors is also potentially 
dangerous for the UNGPs. Dan Danielsen’s research explains that when faced with regulatory 
liability, businesses often structure operations in a manner that amplifies anomalies and 
exploits any regulatory uncertainty.75 If the number of businesses involved in a project 
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influences whether they owe reparations, one could imagine businesses revising their 
operations to avoid liability, rather than to avoid human rights impacts. This would undermine 
the purpose of the UNGPs. 
 The relevance of directness is also contentious. The Thun Group, a network of banks 
collaborating on BHR issues, suggested that a bank’s responsibility could be determined by 
“the strength of [its] directness,” or its “proximity” to the harm.76 They concluded that where 
a bank provides financial support to a party who uses the financing to harm human rights, the 
bank is too far removed from the impact to be “contributing”; the bank could only be “directly 
linked.”77 The Thun Group was resoundingly rebuked by both Ruggie and the UN Working 
Group on Business and Human Rights.78 The Working Group said the term “proximity” was 
unhelpful and could be confusing,79 while Ruggie said the banks’ approach “defies common 
logic.”80 Neither addressed how or when directness might be relevant, but their opposition to 
the Thun Group’s approach raises questions about the seeming emphasis on directness in the 
OHCHR’s definitions.  
Ruggie recognized the need for a “greater understanding of the factors that can drive a 
situation” to be classified in one category of responsibility or another.81 He identified a few 
factors, although it appears his list was not intended to be exhaustive: “the extent to which a 
business enabled, encouraged or motivated human rights harm by another; the extent to which 
it could or should have known about such harm; and the quality of any mitigating steps it has 
taken to address” the impact.82 Ruggie’s factors suggest that the question of a business’s 
responsibility cannot be reduced to the number of actors or the directness of the relationship.83 
What factors are relevant, however, is uncertain. In this section, I examine the only significant 
engagements with the participation terms: guidance by OHCHR, the UN Working Group on 
Business and Human Rights, Ruggie, and OECD;84 an article by Davis;85 and a report by the 
Essex Business and Human Rights Project (“EBHR”), which I co-authored.86 These pieces 
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engage in limited analysis, relying instead on real or hypothetical examples (often the same 
ones) to demonstrate the terms’ application.87 I cluster the examples around the types of 
activities addressed: causing harms through direct action; providing support for military or 
police conduct; economic support for harmful conduct; making unreasonable demands or 
controlling social or economic conditions; and other relationship-based responsibilities. A 
critical reading reveals conflict and confusion over the application of the participation terms, 
as well as some implicit factors I identify in Section 4 in order to design a stronger framework 
of responsibility. 
A. Causing Harms through Direct Action 
 Most of the guidance treats “cause” as self-explanatory, offering only a few examples 
offered. OHCHR, the Working Group, OECD and Davis recognize that a business “causes” a 
harm where it engages in discriminatory financing or hiring practices, breaks up unions, 
pollutes a community’s water supply, and exposes workers to hazardous conditions without 
adequate and appropriate safety equipment.88 EBHR found a company engaged in the war 
crime of “pillage” caused the attendant human rights impacts.89 These examples align with the 
OHCHR approach in which businesses “cause” impacts by acting on their own without the 
support of other actors.90 
B. Examples on Forced Displacements  
 The Working Group and Davis also indicated a business “causes” an impact where it 
threatens landowners or otherwise takes direct action to displace people without ensuring 
adequate human rights safeguards.91 The guidance on the responsibility of businesses for 
forced displacements is particularly instructive because it includes examples of all three types 
of involvement. A bank can “contribute” by financing an infrastructure project without 
adequate human rights safeguards, even if financial support could have otherwise been 
procured.92 Finally, according to OHCHR, a business might be “directly linked to” a harm if it 
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is “one of several financiers to a project,”93 or where, despite assurances to the contrary, a 
government displaces people without adequate human rights safeguards.94 
These examples highlight the problem with the OHCHR’s numeracy-based approach. 
To “cause” the harm, the business must do the displacing. To “contribute,” another actor 
undertakes the displacement while the bank provides material support without insisting on 
adequate safeguards; to be “directly linked,” the bank is one of several companies carrying out 
the same, indirect conduct. Yet, a bank that finances a project undertakes the same conduct, 
via the same relationship, with the same impact on the victims regardless of the number of 
other banks involved. If the participation terms are intended to explain a business’s relationship 
to a harm, the number of actors is less important than the type of activity undertaken as the 
number of participants is unlikely to change the significance of any single actor. 
In the final OHCHR example, the government’s assurances seem to move the bank 
from “contributing” to “directly linked to.” This suggests that where a business seeks to ensure 
adequate safeguards, it may incur less responsibility for subsequent harms. Given that the 
responsibility to respect and remedy is strict and not impacted by the exercise of due 
diligence,95 this poses a logical challenge: due diligence cannot reduce responsibility but efforts 
to secure safeguards as part of a business’s due diligence may. I attempt to resolve this tension 
in Section 4.  
C. Material Support for the Military or Police Activity 
Material support for security forces has also featured heavily in the existing guidance. 
OHCHR and the Working Group found a business “contributes to” a harm “if it lends vehicles 
to security forces” that are used to abuse human rights, or builds or maintains prisons engaged 
in inhuman treatment.96 One of the more interesting conclusions by the Working Group, 
OHCHR, and Davis is that a tech company can “contribute to” impacts by providing a 
government with information or data that is subsequently used to target dissidents for 
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harassment.97 OHCHR added a condition: “If an Internet company’s staff automatically defer 
to every Government request for information about users, regardless of the human rights 
implications, it runs the risk” of contributing to the abuse.98 This could be indicate that the 
predictability of an impact is a relevant factor. It also highlights the importance of independent 
assessment and safeguards when determining a business’s impact. The UNGPs do not require 
a business to breach domestic law,99 but this example suggests that businesses cannot merely 
rely on states’ claims of legality, but at times may need to challenge the state. This raises 
questions about when or how duress might act as a legitimate defense that sit beyond the scope 
of this article but deserves greater attention in scholarship.  
Finally, EBHR considered the responsibility of businesses that supported the 
construction, financing, or maintenance of Israeli settlements.100 The settlements are associated 
with a wide range of long-standing and severe IHRL and international humanitarian law 
violations impacting, inter alia, Palestinians’ rights to life, freedom from torture, housing, 
water, and education.101 Israeli law and public policy, EBHR determined, makes it clear that 
any effort to use leverage to mitigate the violations will be unsuccessful.102 EBHR concluded 
that the severity and duration of the impacts means that any business that might normally be 
considered “directly linked to” will moves along the continuum to “contributing to” the harm 
quickly.103 Even short-term engagements are likely to lead a business to “contribute to” the 
resulting harms, owing remediation.104 
C. Economic Support for Harmful Conduct 
The current guidance includes several examples addressing the responsibility of 
financial actors. As noted above, OHCHR and the Working Group concluded that a bank 
contributes to a harm where it finances a project without proper safeguards for human rights.105 
For a bank to be “directly linked,” OHCHR stated that “the link needs to be between the 
financial product or service provided by the bank and the adverse impact.”106 As such, not all 
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financial support creates a “direct link,”107 although OHCHR did not explain which types of 
financing would fall outside the participation terms’ continuum.  
In addition to being one of several financiers, OHCHR concluded a bank may be 
“directly linked” where a client uses the bank’s financing to support another actor who uses 
the funds to cause or contribute to a harm.108 The Working Group determined a bank may be 
“directly linked” if it (1) manages the assets of a client that causes or contributes to a harm, or 
(2) invests in a company that either “systematically buys produce from farms with child labour” 
or that buys or uses conflict minerals.109 OECD similarly concluded institutional investors can 
contribute to a harm if they actively encourage a company’s management to take specific 
actions that increase the likelihood of foreseeable risks.110 These findings suggest that investing 
in a company is similar to managing assets, and that these activities are distinguishable from 
loans or project financing. The lack of clear analysis makes it impossible to discern the reason 
for this division. There are at least two potential explanations, although both rest on shaky 
foundations.  
One potential interpretation is that the Thun Group’s focus on proximity and directness 
was right, but their application—in which banks are always too far removed to “contribute to” 
a harm111—was wrong. One might assume that a project financier operating on its own has a 
more direct engagement than a bank that joins several other financiers. Similarly, financing 
may be considered a more direct engagement than managing general assets, which involves the 
movement of money that may or may not be directly tied to a project. It is appropriate to 
conclude that, in general, asset management only creates a “direct link to” the harm. A bank 
may monitor the internal nature of a financial transaction to deter the (il)legality of a client’s 
conduct, such as money laundering or terrorist financing, but it cannot determine or monitor 
external characteristics, such as the projects on which a business spends its income.112 This 
does not explain the differences between institutional investors and project financiers. 
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The conclusions on institutional investors are troubling. As Mohammed Alshaleel and 
I explained, institutional investors play an active role in supporting investees, providing an 
infusion of capital through their investment choices.113 We determined that institutional 
investors can “contribute to” a harm in the same way as a project lender. This can trigger a 
responsibility to remediate even if an investor is otherwise passive where it fails to take steps 
to mitigate the risks of human rights impacts.114    
Another explanation for the Working Group’s division between institutional investors 
and project financiers might be that investing is a generalized form of support for a business, 
rather than project-specific. Ascribing responsibility for generalized economic support has 
proven difficult. The South African Truth & Reconciliation Commission found that Swiss 
Banks “save[d] apartheid” when other actors stopped financing the regime.115 The Commission 
determined that the banks owed reparations as “accomplices to a criminal government that 
consistently violated international law.”116 It was, however, incapable of ordering the banks to 
comply with its finding.117 In response, a group of South Africans pursued the banks under the 
ATS.118 The US trial court determined that “simply doing business with a state or individual” 
who violates IHRL cannot give rise to liability.119 For complicity, according to the court, 
support is evaluated by the “quality of the assistance,” which is generally tied to the nature of 
the good.120 Since “[m]oney is a fungible resource,” the court concluded it could not be the 
basis of liability.121 This decision suggests that some business activity is too passive to create 
liability, a conclusion with echoes in the Thun Group’s rejected approach.122 Ruggie repudiated 
the US court when he concluded that businesses have the same responsibility and potential to 
be involved in human rights impacts regardless of industry.123 
Sabine Michalowski provided an important critique of the US court’s approach, arguing 
that the importance of financial support for violations of international law is reflected in anti-
terrorist financing laws.124 More broadly, it is illogical to exclude responsibility for certain 
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industries, like financing, that can be crucial to the commission of a violation.125 Instead, 
Michalowski concludes, the court should have directed its attention to the purpose and conduct 
of the business and its relationship to the harm.126 Michalowski is right. There is no reason to 
excuse material support merely because it is general in nature. A company with an ongoing 
contract or license might lend an actor vehicles or construction equipment127 that are used for 
diverse activities only some of which are prohibited. EBHR criticized several companies for 
exactly this type of support.128 Businesses provide Israel with security equipment that have 
legitimate purposes, but which are routinely employed to commit IHRL violations.129 That the 
equipment can be used legitimately does not excuse a business’s responsibility for 
“contributing to” a harm where it had reason to believe or know that some of its equipment 
would be used to violate IHRL.130 Rather than distinguishing responsibility on the basis of 
whether support is specific or general, a different lens may provide a stronger foundation. I 
return to this issue in Section 4, below.  
E. Unreasonable Demands and Establishing Social or Environmental Conditions 
 Two of Davis’s three ways in which a business might “contribute to” a harm—creating 
“strong incentives” for an impact, or acting “in parallel with a third party, leading to cumulative 
impacts”—feature in several significant examples.131 First, businesses may establish 
unreasonable demands that require or encourage another party to negatively impact human 
rights. The Working Group found a bank “contributes to” a harm where it sets conditions that 
lead a contracted builder to breach labor rights.132 OHCHR pointed to a toy company that 
“makes decisions without regard to how they may impact the ability of suppliers to comply 
with labour rights.”133 Davis employed a similar example, but with a security company setting 
deadlines that are too short for its recruitment company to adequately perform background 
checks.134 OECD echoed this but conditioned responsibility on the foreseeability of the harm, 
using an example of a “retailer that sets a very short lead time for delivery of product” despite 
 16
knowing from past production that “the time is not feasible” and will require excessive 
overtime.135 In these examples, the “contributing” businesses are not in direct control of the 
harm but possess the relational power necessary to influence whether a violation occurs. Davis 
and OHCHR suggested that these are examples of “incentives,” but that is inaccurate. The 
common factor here is not the structure of the conditions—incentives, contractual standards, 
or purchasing requests—but rather the business’s relative power, which allows it to make 
unsustainable demands leading to predictable harms. 
A final example of “incentives” seems misplaced. OHCHR claimed that a construction 
company “contributes to” impacts where it “rewards operational staff purely on their speed … 
and without regard to whether they harm communities.”136 This seems to reflect a belief that 
incentive structures constitute a contribution to, rather than a causation of, a harm. In this case, 
however, the business’s policies are influencing the conduct of its own employees. Such 
incentive structures are not “contributions” but a direct means by which the business’s policies 
and conduct have reduced the enjoyment of relevant rights. 
A different set of examples suggest a business can “contribute to” an impact by 
controlling social or environmental conditions. OHCHR found a business that targets children 
with unhealthy foods or drinks “contributes to” resulting obesity and its attendant health 
problems.137 Davis and OHCHR concluded a business that requires women employees to stay 
late or “leave or arrive outside daylight hours” despite operating “in an area that is dangerous 
for women at night” contributes to the violence its employees experience.138 Unlike the 
examples of the toy company, the bank, or the construction company, these businesses are 
incurring a responsibility for harms directly caused by a third party actor unconnected to the 
business. Ascribing responsibility to these companies only makes sense if one recognizes that 
the business has control over relevant environmental or social factors so that its conduct 
indirectly but clearly and predictably leads to a harm. While the system I propose in the next 
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section takes account of these examples, further scholarship should examine the limits and 
appropriateness of assigning a responsibility for harms directly caused by third party actors 
unconnected to the business.  
F. Other Relationship-Based Responsibilities 
Finally, the current guidance suggests several other ways in which a business may be 
“directly linked to” a harm based on its relationships. OHCHR pointed to a business whose 
supplier engaged in child labor in breach of contractual obligations,139 and Davis concluded 
that it was “clear” that an extractive company would only be “directly linked to” an impact 
caused by its security provider if the extractive company tried to prevent or mitigate the harm 
by enforcing a code of conduct, and screening and monitoring its providers.140 Similar to earlier 
examples, these suggest that introducing safeguards and other efforts at mitigation can 
influence a business’s responsibility.  
OECD introduced an indelicate example, however, when it concluded that a business 
is only “directly linked” where it “sources cobalt mined using child labour” for use in its 
products.141 OECD skims past questions of how the depth of a supply chain or the presence or 
absence of mitigation efforts might affect this determination. OECD’s surrounding guidance 
emphasizes that mitigation efforts can affect a business’s responsibility and notes that various 
business partners—"the smelter, minerals trader, and mining enterprise”—would separate the 
business from the child labor.142 One way to interpret this, which requires reading into OECD’s 
silence, might be that OECD considers natural resource suppliers to enjoy greater power than 
their purchasers.143 Another explanation may be that unlike a purchaser who sets specific 
conditions, a business that passively purchases materials without conditionality cannot 
“contribute” to the harm. This latter interpretation would, of course, cause tension with the 
UNGP’s expectation that businesses proactively engage in HRDD. I pick up on these potential 
interpretations—power as a factor and active versus passive relationships—in the next section. 
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IV. TOWARDS A CLEARER SYSTEM 
Some of the confusion, inconsistency, and tension in the existing guidance may result from a 
reluctance to identify factors that are not explicit within the Guiding Principles. The UN 
Working Group objected when the Thun Group claimed “proximity” is a relevant factor, in 
part because “the concept of ‘proximity’ … is not one that is found in the UNGPs, and it risks 
creating confusion rather than clarification.”144 Such reluctance might reflect fears, represented 
by Danielsen’s work,145 that any enumerated list of criteria will simply lead businesses to 
restructure operations without increased respect for human rights. Such concern is borne out in 
the Thun Group’s efforts to define “proximity” in a manner that would limit a bank’s liability 
for its direct impacts.146 These concerns should not, however, lead BHR to abandon clear 
criteria. Instead, the field should develop a system of accountability that embodies the purposes 
of the UNGPs with the flexibility needed to respond to new business models and activities. 
Such a system could also correct some of the weaknesses in the existing definitions, including 
OHCHR’s focus on the number of actors involved, which, as I explained above, is illogical and 
potentially dangerous.147 A different approach is needed. 
One potential direction, alluded to above,148 would stress responsibility for active 
engagement or direct control over passive engagement. This is suggested by the Working 
Group’s differentiated responsibility for asset managers, institutional investors, and project 
financiers.149 In this section, I first consider the problems with an “active engagement” 
framework before articulating a new approach for responsibility under the UNGPs, built on 
five factors that can determine where a business sits on the continuum of responsibility.  
A. Problems with an “Active Engagement” Framework 
A framework focused on “active engagement” could result in arbitrary distinctions, 
and, as with the OHCHR numeracy approach, lead businesses to restructure their operations 
without protecting for human rights. Already, Jena Martin asserts, businesses intentionally 
 19
portray themselves as “bystanders” so as to avoid accountability.150 She demonstrates this with, 
among other cases, Shell’s response to the Nigerian government’s infamous 1995 killing of 
Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders.151 Nigeria targeted the Ogoni because they 
protested Shell’s environmental impacts on their traditional lands.152 Shell was allowed to 
observe the criminal trial of the Ogoni, which breached IHRL standards, while international 
press were excluded.153 While the African commonwealth suspended Nigeria’s membership 
for three years,154 Shell’s actions added credibility to Nigeria’s activity.155 Shell claimed it bore 
no responsibility because it was merely a witness, and not an active participant, in the 
violations.156 Martin rightfully argues that such “passive” instances of “bystander” activity can 
lend legitimacy or moral support to harmful conduct.157 She called for an international 
framework capable of addressing such relationships.158 
Martin considered Shell’s conduct leading up to the execution,159 but equally important 
is what followed. Two days after Saro-Wiwa was hanged, Shell finalized a deal with the 
Nigerian government worth $2.5 billion USD.160 At a time when the international community 
was censuring the state, Shell’s conduct (albeit not its public words161) represented an embrace 
of the regime. The company might not have directly carried out the breach, but, at best, it 
provided an economic lifeline for the military regime and, at worst, an economic reward for 
the violation.  
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) has 
concluded the passive observers can incur international responsibility. It found that “presence, 
when combined with authority, can constitute assistance in the form of moral support,” 
fulfilling the actus reus for complicity.162 The tribunal determined that the leader of a special 
unit in a non-state armed group aided and abetted crimes committed by the commander of a 
different unit in the same armed group.163 The accused was well-regarded by the principal 
perpetrator and the tribunal concluded that the defendant’s mere presence “had a significant 
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legitimizing or encouraging effect.”164 The ICTY recognized that assessing responsibility 
through a lens of “active” versus “passive” does not adequately capture the necessary nuance 
of moral support.  
Both Martin and the ICTY were right to recognize that passive conduct can constitute 
a necessary contribution that furthers the likelihood of a harm occurring. This is particularly 
important for BHR. As with OHCHR’s numeracy-based approach and the US court’s 
conclusions with regard to banks financing apartheid, a framework centered on dividing 
“active” from “passive” responsibility is likely to draw arbitrary distinctions incapable of 
appropriately addressing the relationship between a business and a harm. Moreover, it would 
sit in tension with the UNGPs, which recognize that businesses can, or should, incur a 
responsibility for certain passive involvements. This is most evident in the expectation that 
businesses “directly linked to” an impact should actively use leverage to affect change in the 
conduct of others, and the failure to do so can incur a responsibility to provide remediation. 
The Guiding Principles cannot reasonably attribute to businesses a responsibility to respond 
actively to a situation where they would normally be passively while shielding them from 
liability only if they remain bystanders.  
B. Focusing on Power and Independence 
I propose a system built on a businesses’ power and independence to facilitate or 
prevent abuse. BHR developed in response to concerns that the power of businesses eclipses 
that of many states, creating an accountability gap for businesses that harm human rights.165 
Redressing these power differentials and their impact on human rights is the raison d’etre of 
BHR. Yet, power is not an absolute concept.166 There are numerous ways in which a business 
can exercise, limit, or surrender its power. The significance of power, and its changing nature, 
crystallizes in the expectation that a business that is “directly linked to” a harm but does not 
naturally have power, or in the UNGPs’ terminology “leverage,” should increase its power in 
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order to affect change.167 It is, therefore, appropriate to situate the lens of responsibility on 
power. When considered more closely, the current guidance bears this out.  
i. Three Forms of Power 
The existing guidance points to three forms of power: direct control; relational power; 
and power over relevant social and environmental conditions. Direct control, meaning the 
direct creation or mitigation of a harm, is evident in the examples where a business “causes” a 
harm: discrimination in hiring or financing; breaking up unions; polluting water supplies; and 
committing war crimes.168 Relational power refers to the ability of a business to influence the 
conduct of another actor because of its economic, moral, or practical influence. Where a 
business exercises strong relational power, it can issue unreasonable demands and expectations 
that lead other actors to cause an impact. This is evident with the toy company and its 
supplier.169 Relational power also explains the expectations on businesses to employ leverage 
when they are “directly linked to” a harm; a business’s relational power to affect change incurs 
a responsibility to use it. Finally, businesses may have power over relevant environmental and 
social conditions that give rise to the harm. Where an employer sets working hours in an 
environment that subjects women employees to a heightened risk of violence,170 it controls the 
conditions that lead to the harm. The same is true where a business targets children with surgery 
drinks, leading to obesity.171 The direct cause of the harms stem from a third party’s conduct, 
but the harms occur, in part, because the businesses creates the conditions by which the 
likelihood of a predictable harm substantially increases.  
Each form of power operates on its own continuum from strong to weak. For example, 
a business that supplies another actor with weapons or construction equipment172 may have no 
direct power but may have intermediate relational power that it can exercise by including 
human rights clauses in their contracts,173 providing appropriate training,174 or limiting the sale 
or provision of goods and services that can harm human rights. If, for example, a business is 
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the largest manufacturer of a particular weapon, it enjoys strong relational power. Conversely, 
a highly dependent supplier—for example, a manufacturer whose principle purchaser is a 
powerful brand name—will have weak relational power. Where a business has strong power, 
it is more likely to be causing or contributing to the harm; where it has weak power—where a 
bank manages assets,175 it has no direct control, limited relational control, and no relationship 
to the conditions—it appears “directly linked to” the harm. Power, however, is not the only 
relevant consideration and it will intersect with other factors that can influence a business’s 
responsibility.  
ii. Independence 
Independence as a factor focuses on whether a business’s ability to respect human rights 
in a particular situation can be evaluated in isolation from the conduct of others. Where a 
business is dependent on others, the question becomes whether it could and did take steps to 
ensure those actors meet their responsibilities. The significance of independence appears in 
several examples but is most palpable in the OHCHR’s determination that a tech company 
contributes to a harm where it acquiesces without questioning a government’s requests.176 
OHCHR expected the tech company to exercise its independence to question the government’s 
conduct. As with power, independence operates on its own continuum and businesses may 
exercise strong, weak, or intermediate independence. A business directly engaged in 
discriminatory practices or one that displaces individuals without adequate protections177 has 
a strong level of independence whereas a purchaser highly dependent on a supplier to respect 
human rights has a weak level of independence. 
Independence, like power, is not absolute and can take many forms. A business that is 
“directly linked to a harm” is merely expected to use its leverage to affect change, which 
(except in severe cases) need not be immediately successful. In this context, the business’s 
ability to meet its responsibility is not dependent on the other actor, but this can change if the 
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harm is severe and its use of leverage is unsuccessful. At that point, the business may need to 
terminate its relationship and the focus shifts to whether the business could and did terminate 
the relationship. 
ii. Intersecting Power and Independence  
Power will often intersect with independence. A company that undertakes a project 
requiring the forced displacement of a population, or one that carries out that displacement, 
will generally exercise significant direct power and independence. Power and independence 
may not always intersect, however. A bank that finances a project can have strong relational 
power via its loan conditions,178 but only intermediate independence. It can adopt practices that 
deter harmful conduct or sanction a business after a harm occurs but cannot directly prevent a 
harm. Similarly, a toy company179 may have such strong relational control over its supplier 
than it becomes equivalent to the supplier’s direct control. In this case, the independence of 
each business is intermediate, as their involvement depends at least partly on the conduct of 
the other. This highlights an important difference between my proposed system of 
accountability and the OHCHR’s numbers-based approach; once one rejects the number of 
actors involved as a relevant factor, “cause” becomes a qualitatively different relationship than 
“contributes to.” More than one actor can “cause” a harm if the qualitative contribution is 
essential or significant to the harm’s occurrence. It is therefore conceivable that a business 
might move along the full continuum from “directly linked to” to “cause,” depending on its 
actions and response to the situation. The number of actors and their individual involvement 
might affect the quantum of reparations owed—further scholarship should investigate when 
and how this might occur—but not the nature of their responsibility.  
Reformulating questions of HRDD and mitigation into ones of power and independence 
may also help answer one of the more difficult questions raised by the guidance: why do some 
efforts at mitigation or HRDD affect a business’s responsibility if the responsibility to 
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remediate is strict and independent of due diligence efforts? A business that seeks assurances 
from a state that human rights will be respected180 has used its relational power and its 
independence to prevent the harm. It provided no material or moral support, has no direct power 
over the harm, and has no further independence to stop the harm. The same would hold true 
for a company whose security forces or subcontractors breach a business’s routinely 
maintained code of conduct.181 Where a business has utilized its power and independence to 
prevent a harm by adopting and maintaining a code, it has only weak or non-existent power 
and independence at the time of the harm. In these cases, the business’s responsibility is lower 
than it would have been had the business’s not undertaken mitigation efforts. This 
interpretation demands caution as businesses may try to invoke a subjective feeling of 
powerlessness to suggest they could not have done more to prevent a harm.182 It may be more 
appropriate to treat mitigation as an independent factor, which I do this below. 
Power and independence appear to be the most important and consistent factors. Their 
intersection would help initially situate a business on the responsibility continuum. Yet, it is 
clear from the existing guidance that other factors may play a secondary role, moving the 
business along the continuum, either towards “causing” a harm where it might have otherwise 
been “directly linked to,” or towards “directly linked to” where it might have otherwise 
“contributed to” the harm. In the existing guidance, I find three such factors: the severity and 
predictability of a harm, and the mitigation efforts employed by a business.  
C. Severity, Predictability and Mitigation as Secondary Factors 
i. Severity  
Since a foundational premise of the UNGPs is that all businesses owe a responsibility 
to respect all human rights at all times,183 treating the severity of a harm as a relevant factor 
may seem counterintuitive. Yet, the existing guidance makes it clear that the severity of a harm 
matters where a business is “directly linked to” a harm but fails to exercise leverage or its 
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leverage is ineffective.184 The more severe a harm, the more quickly a business needs to see 
change or else it will move along the responsibility continuum.185 EBHR’s conclusions 
emphasize this relationship between severity and time, concluding as they do that even short-
term engagements can constitute a “contribution” where the harms are particularly severe and 
leverage will clearly be ineffective.186  
ii. Predictability187 
The predictability of a harm also seems to matter when determining a business’s 
responsibility, even if due diligence efforts do not. Predictability is a dangerous factor as it has 
been used by businesses to excuse their responsibility in situations where the risks were clearly 
present and known but the business did not predict the harm or take the risk seriously.188 Given 
that the responsibility to respect and remediate is a strict one, the predictability of an impact 
seems irrelevant where an initial assessment indicates a business has “caused” the harm. Where 
predictability does seem helpful, however, is in determining whether a business is “directly 
linked to” or “contributing to” a harm. Predictability appears particularly relevant where a 
business’s conduct can have legitimate or illegitimate purposes, such as asking a contractor to 
meet a short deadline or providing equipment or information to a state’s military or police. 
Here, a business’s responsibility may increase where a risk is predictable and salient in light of 
the industry or a political and/or social environment.189 Normally, a business would not be 
responsible for “causing” or “contributing to” an assault that takes place after hours and off 
company property; nor would we expect a business to provide remedies to a consumer whose 
personal habits are the direct cause of a harm. Yet, a business that requires women to work late 
in a dangerous environment or a beverage company that intentionally targets children190 can 
and should have predicted these risks. By failing to take action to address these predictable 
harms, the businesses’ responsibilities increase. 
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iii. Mitigation 
  Similar to severity and predictability, mitigation as a factor creates tension with the 
claim191 that the responsibility to respect is a strict one. Yet, the guidance repeatedly suggests 
that in a narrow set of cases such efforts can reduce a business’s responsibility from 
“contributing to” to “directly linked to.” This is the inverse of a business’s increasing 
responsibility when it is directly linked to a harm but fails to use its leverage to affect change.192 
Where a business exercises controls through contractual clauses, codes of conduct, or 
assurances aimed at preventing a harm directly caused by another, a business appears “directly 
linked” to the harm even if its conduct would normally be considered a “contribution.”193  
D. The Confluence of Factors in the System 
The system I propose, and the factors I identify, focus on the substantive relationships 
between the business and the harm. This represents a marked departure from the OHCHR’s 
emphasis on the number of actors but aligns well with the purpose of the UNGPs.194 Focusing 
on the number of actors is likely to encourage businesses to restructure operations to avoid 
liability but may not provide benefits to affected individuals and communities. A system built 
around the business’s power, independence, and mitigation efforts, and the severity and 
predictability of the harm has the potential to encourage businesses to change their operations 
to avoid human rights impacts, not simply liability.  
Throughout this article, I have referred to this new proposal as a “system of 
accountability.” Systems theory recognizes that both naturally occurring and human-made 
systems have interrelated and interdependent parts that are best understood through their 
relationship with one another.195 While I have identified five factors, the determination of a 
business’s responsibility is dependent on how these five factors interact, influence, and change 
one another. As an open system,196 these factors can interact not only with one another but also 
with external elements so that as the context of a harm shifts, the importance of any one factor 
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and the dynamics between them might change. As such, a business might “move along the 
continuum” in two ways. First, this might occur during an initial assessment of responsibility 
when the confluence of factors changes. In this approach, issues of power and independence 
might initially determine a business’s responsibility but the assessment changes when 
predictability, severity, or mitigation are considered. Alternatively, by failing to respond 
appropriately to lower forms of responsibility, a business may move along the continuum to 
incur greater responsibility. This has a temporal feature: elapses in time change the 
responsibility, either quickly or slowly depending on the confluence of factors.  
The simultaneous and seemingly contradictory claims that the responsibility to 
remediate is strict but sometimes mitigation efforts should be used can also be explained, or at 
least rationalized, by the proposed system. While the factors interact in this system, they do not 
carry the same weight. Power and independence are more important than predictability, 
mitigation, and severity. Where the former two factors determine a business has “caused” a 
harm, the latter three factors lose resonance. This is an appropriate application of the UNGPs’ 
strict responsibility to remediate.197 The qualitative difference of “causation” carries with it a 
recognition that best efforts are irrelevant when the business’s control and independence 
indicate it should have prevented the harm. The movement between “directly linked” and 
“contributing to” appears more fluid and reliant on the confluence of all factors. As a result, 
while a business’s responsibility might increase in this system, it cannot always decrease. The 
severity, predictability and mitigation factors cannot alleviate the responsibility of a business 
whose conduct was essential to the harm’s occurrence.  
V. UNDERSTANDING THE SYSTEM OF RESPONSIBILITY  
The system I propose above is founded upon the UNGPs and based on factors that can 
be identified from the existing guidance, but represents a new approach to the participation 
terms that provides for more rigorous and nuanced analysis of a specific cases, and which 
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encourages businesses to proactively manage their impacts. Once one abandons an approach 
centered on the number of actors involved, then the system not only gives content to the 
participation terms but can operate as a stand-alone approach to businesses’ responsibility. 
Within this system, the continuum extends between the three participation terms, giving rise to 
qualitatively different levels of responsibility for each term. To explain the application of this 
system, I return to the treatment of the Uyghur workers in the supply chains of companies like 
Volkswagen and Apple. I use these two companies as proxies for the others to consider how 
the confluence of factors can affect responsibility. Unfortunately, many facts about the 
relationships and mitigation efforts in that case are unknown, but this allows for a broad 
examination of how the case could be resolved, depending on which facts come to light.  
Assume, temporarily, that three or four tiers of contractors and sub-contractors separate 
Volkswagen and Apple from the factories using the forced labor of Uyghur workers. Without 
further information, it would appear that the transnational brands’ relational control is weak 
due to the sub-contractors separating the two companies. The brands also have no 
independence. Initially, they would appear to be “directly linked to” the impact, but not 
contributing to it. However, forced labor is a severe harm and is highly predictable in any retail-
based supply chain.198 Chinese manufacturing firms, in particular, have a history of abusive 
working conditions.199 With the increased predictability and severity of the harm, the system 
of responsibility calls for reconsidering the companies’ power. Both companies exercise 
significant relational power over their direct suppliers,200 and could use it to insist on 
contractual clauses, codes of conduct, training programs, and confidential reporting lines aimed 
at reducing the use of forced labor in their supply chains. They also have strong power and 
independence concerning where they source from. While they may benefit from aspects of 
manufacturing in China, they could change suppliers or relocate their manufacturing operations 
to avoid being involved in such a severe breach of IHRL.201  
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Under the proposed system, the companies’ responsibility hinges on what steps they 
have taken in response to the severe and predictable risks. Their responsibility cannot be 
excused simply because the Chinese government is “causing” the harm; their responsibility to 
respect human rights is independent of the government’s willingness to meet its IHRL 
obligations.202 If the companies have enacted appropriate mitigation efforts, they move along 
the continuum towards “directly linked to;” if they fail to do so, they would be “contributing 
to” the harms. The UNGPs explicitly recognize that the expected mitigation response may be 
scaled up or down depending on the size of the relevant companies and the severity of the 
risk.203 Given the power and size of Apple and Volkswagen, one could expect them to 
undertake robust mitigation efforts, including contractual terms on human rights, codes of 
conduct, training, and/or confidential reporting lines, or some combination of these measures. 
If these efforts prove effective, the brands can retain the relationship and remain only “directly 
linked to” the harm, never moving along the continuum. The severity of the impacts, however, 
means that if their efforts are ineffective, the businesses need to consider ways to terminate 
their relationships without exacerbating the harms. Similarly, if they take no steps, the severity 
of forced labor means that their responsibility increases quickly, and where they might have 
been only “directly linked to” the harm, the confluence of factors means the businesses risk 
jointly “causing” the violation alongside the suppliers and the Chinese government.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The UNGPs were intended to help answer a long-standing debate over the 
responsibility of businesses for human rights impacts caused by their operations and activities. 
The participation terms play a central role in the UNGPs, delineating when a business 
independently owes a responsibility to provide remedies. The current approach to the 
participation terms stems from limited guidance heavy with hypothetical examples but weak 
in critical analysis. It uses the number of actors involved in a harm as a dominant factor in 
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categorizing businesses’ responsibility. As I argued, this can act as an incentive for businesses 
to reform their structures to avoid responsibility rather than reforming their practices to avoid 
human rights impacts. For the UNGPs to work effectively, the participation terms need clearer 
content. 
In this article, I critically engage for the first time in scholarship with the existing 
guidance on the participation terms. In addition to revealing inconsistency and confusion in the 
guidance, I propose a new system of responsibility that moves away from the number of actors 
to the nature of a business’s relationship to the resulting harm. This system is built around five 
factors: the power (direct, relational, and over social or environmental conditions), 
independence, and mitigation efforts of the business; and the predictability and severity of the 
harms. As I explain, these factors are implicit in the existing guidance, so that the new system 
will often result in similar findings to the current guidance but with a clearer reasoning, greater 
nuance, and a more context-specific analysis. By recognizing that a business’s responsibility 
to provide remediation will change depending on the context and its own conduct, I introduce 
a system that should encourage businesses to take a proactive role in managing their 
relationships. As such, this system better aligns with the intent and purpose of the UNGPs than 
the current guidance. 
While there are five factors, they do not carry equal weight in this new system. If a 
business exercises strong power and independence so that it is “causing” a harm, the strict 
nature of the responsibility to respect means the other factors will not reduce its responsibility. 
The business’s mitigation efforts, and the severity and predictability of the harm can otherwise 
move a business along the continuum in both directions, either towards “directly linked to” or 
towards “causation.” Stemming from and aligned with the UNGPs, this system can stand on 
its own. By emphasizing power and independence, with the recognition that additional factors 
might change the dynamics between actors, I introduce a system that is comfortable with, and 
 31
capable of addressing, nuanced distinctions between cases. I demonstrate how this system 
might affect the responsibility of transnational brands for the use of forced labor in their supply 
chains. Further scholarship should test the system to determine whether additional factors are 
needed, and to analyze its adequacy in specific industries, such as arms manufacturing.   
Because a business’s responsibility is based on the confluence of five factors, I set forth 
a claim that “cause” is qualitatively, not quantitatively, different from “contributes to” and is 
the end of the responsibility continuum. As a result, multiple businesses can jointly “cause” a 
harm. This carries an implicit suggestion that businesses that “cause” a harm owe more in terms 
of substantive remediation than businesses that “contribute to” the harm. Further scholarship 
should examine this issue. By challenging the existing guidance, I was able to construct a 
stronger system of responsibility that aligns with the UNGPs, can answer some of the more 
difficult questions within BHR, while opening up new possibilities for scholarship. 
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